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The Philosopher's Stone
The Newsletter of The Philosophical Debate Group

Who Are You?
Some Things to Consider. . .
Thales said, "Know Thyself." What did he mean? Why is it necessary to explore
who you are and what you mean? Why didn't Thales tell us how to go about finding
this knowledge? Is there a specific effective method, or is the path ambiguous? Who
are you? What do people ask themselves about themselves, and how does one go
about finding the answers? How do we define ourselves as individuals against the
mass of other individuals? What does it mean to be self-aware? Is the self a unity, or
do we perceive several disparate selves within our selves? As Walker Percy asks, how
can we know so much about quasars and black holes, and so little about ourselves?

Dr. Ann Hartle
Will be visiting AASU
on April 9, 1998
Lecture to be held at 12:15
in Ashmore Auditorium
Luncheon to follow at 1:30
in the MCC Faculty Lounge
This event is free and open to the public. For
directions or more information, contact Dr. Erik
Nordenhaug, 921-7322. Email: nordener@mail.armstrong.edu
Sponsored by
The Philosophical Debate Group

An Excerpt from Dr. Hartle's Book, Self-Knowledge in the Age of Theory
. . . Yet there is a sense in which our own age does seem to be unique, a sense in
which the search for self-knowledge is historically conditioned. We must start form
the historical fact that we live in "the age of theory." Shortly before he died in 1990,
Walker Percy described the twentieth century as "the most scientifically advanced,
savage, democratic, inhuman, sentimental, murderous century in human history." The
name Percy gives to this present "demented" age is "the age of theory." The human
being who seeks to understand himself in this demented age is compelled to wander in
the desert: "the self finds itself ever more conspicuously without a place in the modern
world, which is perfectly understood by theorizing." The self is without a place
because theory can never encompass the self. Hence, the second part, the other side,
of Percy's description: this is the age of the theorist-consumer: "The consumer, who
thought he knew what he wanted-the consumption of the goods and services of
scientific theory-is not in fact satisfied, even when the services offered are such
techniques as 'personal growth,' 'emotional maturity,' 'consciousness-raising,' and
suchlike." The theorist and the consumer are two sides of the same coin; they are the
same individual. But neither is satisfied, both are lost in the desert. The division of the
self into an all-transcending objective consciousness and a consumer-self with a list of
needs is the condition that Percy characterizes as the "monstrous bifurcation of man
into angelic and bestial components."
Contemplating the Self
By: Tiffanie L.C. Rogers
The self that others perceive in a given individual is not the self which is in
actuality the complete self of that individual. In whatever capacity or through
whatever duration we are acquainted with someone, we gather an incomplete vision of
them as a human being. Ironically, the internal self to the individual-that of which the
individual is "self-aware"-is not more complete than the perceptions of others. From
within, the perspective of the internal eye is limited in its perceptive capacity; like the
physical eye, it cannot see itself.
It is also highly biased. This bias, being a product of the same experiences which
shape the character of the self, limits the ability for objective judgment. Being aware
of this impediment to the journey of self-knowledge does not negate the blindness
which one incurs from it. Yet we endeavor to perpetually accumulate more and more
understanding of who we are and what we mean in the vast scheme of things. The
accuracy of our self-knowledge seems to parallel the graph of a cubic function; ever
approaching the axis line, yet always with distance to cover. Analogically more
descriptive, Gabriel's Horn, a solid produced when the region R = {(x,y) x 1,0 y 1/x}

is rotated around the x-axis, will have an infinite surface area-and a finite volume!
Like the self-an infinite number of external points of expression, a finite volume of
knowledge which can be attained.
This figure for analogy is no Klein bottle; the parameters of the inside remain
distinct from the external. Though part of the same whole, there remain two diverse
perspectives. What others see from the outside is a projection, some of which the
individual is conscious and some of which he or she is not aware, of some limited
combination of the infinite points of expression of which that individual is capable.
Given the extraordinary ambiguities, how do we extract definition and meaning from
our limited knowledge of the self? When faced with the Cartesian cogito ergo sum,
we can accept the simple statement in and of itself, but how do we comprehend the
integral parts of the composite whole of the "I"? We attempt to define, label, and
categorize-in good enlightenment fashion-the characteristics of the individual self and
the influences and experiences which build a cohesion of the diverse particulars. We
are led to believe that the self is simply a universal set S (which in itself is a subset of
the universal set of Other Selves, etc.), and that if we can identify the given members
of the subset which comprise the individual set S then we have adequately discovered
what the self is. We envision a human ability to rationalize and define everything and
we implement paradigms and models, and that which does not fit our contrived
system is characterized, an anomaly, in its own particular category.
Yet it seems that the more we attempt to systematically define the self, the less
accurate our understanding of what the self is becomes. If we define the self as X
thing, then X is separate and distinct from that thing which is naming and defining it.
It cannot define itself, for it cannot know itself completely, yet it cannot be understood
externally, for it cannot be fully comprehended from an external perspective. This
dilemma is related to another: there is always the problem of the "I" that defines the
"I". So where do our paradigms and theories leave us?
Dr. Ann Hartle, in her book Self-Knowledge in the Age of Theory, proclaims
that "Theory cannot speak to the passions and cannot form character. . .the self cannot
be encompassed by theory" (xiii). Through all of our efforts to define and categorize
the self in a contrived, contained system, we lose the elements which create meaning
in our character. And we lose the elements of passions which make us human. What
do we mean by "lose" them? It seems to me that where we encounter a concept which
we cannot reconcile within our systems, we tend to lose interest in them. We lose
touch with them. We lose our sense of their importance until we feel that the
importance previously placed on them was misplaced. When we name and define
something, we lose what other elements it may have had by restricting it to a
particular denotation. The definition of the self and its restriction in being conformed
to given theories limit the self's extent as a self.

Dr. Hartle also speaks of alternative methods for the acquisition of selfknowledge, such as anti-theory. Where theory attempts to generalize everything into
neat categories which defy individuality, the attempts of anti-theory to get outside of
the constraints of theory particularize aspects of the self into their separation from the
whole. Theory renders us selfless by absorption; anti-theory renders us selfless by
removing us from our social context. The relativism of anti-theory destroys ethics as
each self's circumstances become their own justification for action.
Is there an adequate means by which to conduct this search? Can we find
ourselves? What are some other possible approaches to the problem? Join us on April
9th to explore this topic. . .

Labyrinthine Lexicon
Name Withheld Upon Request

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English says that the self is "individuality,
personality, or essence"; an "object of introspection or reflexive action"; or "one's own
interests or pleasure, or concentration on these." Keeping in mind that Dr. Johnson
defined lexicographers as "harmless drudges," let's ask a few questions about this
definition.
If we say that the self is individuality, then we must, of course, know what
individuality is. According to this dictionary it would mean something along the lines
of being a distinct and unique human being in the class of humans. What
characteristics, internal or external, concrete or abstract, does one individual have that
no other individual possesses? Or do we mean a distinct combination of non-unique
characteristics which differentiate one being from another?
Would we say that each individual has unique experiences which shape her or his
personality? Why can't two people have the same experience? Is it necessarily the
experience which is shaping us or do we also shape the experience in some way
through individual perspective and interpretation? What causes each of us to interpret
experiences differently? (And what, for that matter,–for the Humians out there–
"causes" us to assume there is a cause?)
Essence, according to this dictionary, has to do with a "fundamental nature" or
"inherent characteristics." Fundamental is a "foundation" (and, recursively,
"essential"). If the self is the essence of the being–the basis or foundation for that
being–then surely we know what the constituent parts of this basis are and what
precisely they are the foundation for. (If we're not sure, we can simply look up

"self.") And as for the second definition, we have defined the self as inherent
(essence) and as acquired (personality).
If, on the other hand, we go with the second definition and say that the self is the
object of introspection, what is examining the thoughts of what? Which part is the
self–the subject or the object? Can the subject and the object be the same thing? Not
according to this dictionary. . .
"Harmless drudge?" I think not. I could enjoy writing at length about why this
definition gives me a headache. But the problem is denotation in general. Of course
it can break down if we analyze it to death. And for some reason words seem to be
inadequate to convey what we mean by other words, which implies not only that
language itself is dynamic, but also that there is some element of meaning that is
restricted by definition. Definition is not equivalent to meaning–it is a limited
expression thereof.
So what is it exactly that we are looking for when we are trying to define the
self? Surely we don't mean to restrict it. Are we trying to understand something that
is beyond language's capacity to convey? What does that imply about language and
understanding? What does that imply about the self?

We found out that we have More Time. . .And we're going to
share it with You!!!

The deadline for the 2nd Annual Philosophical
Essay Contest has been extended to April
10th!
Take this chance to submit your essays now!

Guidelines:
•Competitors must be students of AASU during the 97-98 academic year
•Essays must focus on a philosopher or some philosophical topic
•Essays must be a minimum of 1,000 words and include your name and phone number

Awards will be given to first, second, and third place winners.
Submissions can be dropped off at any time in The Thought Box, located in The Writing Center
in Gamble Hall, or can be given to Dr. Erik Nordenhaug in the Department of Languages,
Literature, and Dramatic Arts.

Self-Realization

-t.
I look into your eyes and see a stranger
feeling. Yet i wonder as I turn
away if there may be a greater danger
i search, although I fear to learn.
Hide-and-seek between the blotted pages
i play. Seeking to find a place to
hide from that which I seek in sages
there. Yet i am here, too.
I look beyond the glass into the silver
tearing. A frozen lake beyond me,
i find peace within the pages, though a
sliver;
The rivers dammed, i am free.
Butterfly, i see, flittering in the early mist
above the pink flowers, beyond the pane
of my window. In searching i somehow
missed
your beauty; still, I have forgotten your
name.

Spring Quarter
Meeting Schedule
Gamble Hall, Room 205
8:30 p.m.
Wednesday. . .

April 1, 15, 29
May 13, 27

